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Detention of Private Persons by Private Persons as a 
Delictual Wrong: Liability for Deprivation of Liberty 
in Scots Private Law 
By Dr. Jonathan Brown 
 
|Preamble| 
Jonathan Brown is a lecturer in Scots Private Law at the University of 
Strathclyde in Glasgow. Previously he was a lecturer in law at Aberdeen’s 
Robert Gordon University. Jonathan considers himself to be a private law 
generalist and dabbling legal historian. His recent publications include work 
on medical jurisprudence, the law of defamation and the relation between the 
Roman law of slavery and modern Scottish human trafficking legislation. The 
present essay is intended to provide a modern account which places acts 
amounting to wrongful detention effected by private persons within the 
taxonomy of iniuria. 
 
Introduction 
‘False imprisonment’ is, in English law, a strict liability tort.108 It is thus 
actionable regardless of the mind-state of the perpetrator,109 regardless of 
whether or not the victim suffers any demonstrable ‘loss’ or ‘damage’110 and 
indeed regardless of whether or not the ‘victim’ knew that they had in fact been 
falsely imprisoned.111 To adopt the English lawyer’s term of art, the tort is 
actionable ‘per se’.112 In general terms, conduct amounts to ‘false 
imprisonment’ if the perpetrator has imposed some constraint on the freedom 
of movement from a particular place ordinarily enjoyed by another 
individual.113 Conceptually, ‘false imprisonment’ falls, as a ‘cause of action’, 
under the umbrella of the ‘form of action’ known as ‘trespass to the person’,114 
albeit unhappily so in the view of some learned authority.115 While it has been 
said that the ‘categorisation of trespasses to the person is an ongoing source of 
 
108 Regina v. Governor of Her Majesty's Prison Brockhill Ex Parte Evans [2001] 2 A.C. 19, at 26 per 
Lord Slynn 
109 Although this proposition is now complicated by the fact that the courts require the act amounting to 
physical imprisonment to have been ‘intentional’ – see Lumba v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department [2012] 1 AC 245, per Lord Dyson JSC at para.65 
110 Ibid., para.64 
111 Murray v Ministry of Defence [1988] 1 WLR 692, at 703a-c per Lord Griffiths  
112 Lumba, para.63 
113 Collins v Wilcock [1984] 1 WLR 1172, at 1177 per Goff LJ 
114 Mulheron, Tort Law, p.685 
115 Wainwright v Home Office [2001] EWCA Civ. 2081, per Buxton LJ at para.68 
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confusion’,116 it remains the case that ‘the distinction [between actions of 
trespass and actions on the case] still continues to hold good’.117 England may 
have buried her forms of action, but, to this day, those forms do continue to 
exercise an influence over Common law jurisprudence.   
Scotland is not, in spite of its historical and ongoing political union with 
England, a Common law jurisdiction.118 Indeed, Scots law knows of no ‘torticle’ 
by the name of ‘false imprisonment’.119 In Scotland, ‘trespass’ refers only to 
‘transient interference with another person’s land [or sufficiently large 
moveable, such as a ship]120 without right to do so’.121 The phrase ‘trespass to 
a chattel’ has been described as being ‘perfectly unmeaning’ by the Scottish 
courts122 and the concept of ‘trespass to the person’ is likewise foreign to 
lawyers north of the Tweed.123 This is not to say that Scots law does not afford 
protection to individual liberty in private law. Rather, it is simply the case that 
the juridical history of the protection of ‘personality rights’ in Scotland differs 
quite drastically from the schema which has developed in the Common law 
world.124  
‘Affronts to liberty’ were termed by Stair ‘the most bitter and atrocious 
forms of injury’.125 The word ‘injury’, here, appears as a term of art and does 
not simply denote (as it typically does today) bodily harm suffered by a legal 
subject. Rather, it refers to what MacKenzie termed, in his 17th century opus 
on Matters Criminal,126 ‘contumely or reproach’.127 This usage was common to 
Civilian jurisdictions in the Seventeenth century128 and at this time (though 
not immune to influence from south of the border)129 Scotland was 
unquestionably a part of the wider European legal family and subject only to 
 
116 Mulheron, Principles, p.685 
117 Ibid., p.686 
118 See the Hon. Lord Gill, Quo Vadis Leges Romanorum?, passim. 
119 Blackie, Protection of Corpus, p.160 
120 See Whitty, Rights of Personality, p.215 
121 Anderson, Property, para.10.18 
122 Leitch & Co v Leydon 1931 SC (HL) 1 at 8 
123 Whitty, Rights of Personality, p.215 
124 For the history of ‘personality rights’ in Scotland, see Blackie, Unity in Diversity, passim. For 
comment on the wider ius commune, see Blackie, Doctrinal History, passim. 
125 Stair, Inst., 1, 2, 2 
126 On the significance of the equivalence of crime and delict during this period of Scots law, see Blackie 
and Chalmers, Mixing and Matching in Scottish Delict and Crime, p.286 
127 MacKenzie, Matters Criminal, (1678), p.303 
128 Blackie, Doctrinal History, p.14 
129 Blackie, Unity in Diversity, p.104 
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limited Common law influence.130 Thus, it is apparent that the term ‘injury’ 
here corresponds with the Roman idea of iniuria within the context of the actio 
iniuriarum.131 This is significant: Due to the significance of the Scottish 
‘institutional writers’,132 it remains the case today that ‘interference with the 
personal liberty of an individual which is not warranted by law will justify an 
actio iniuriarum for solatium’.133  
The ‘legal ancestor’ of the Scottish action(s) for deprivation of liberty, in 
the context of private law and outwith the context of actions involving public 
authorities,134 is therefore markedly distinct from that of the English concept 
of ‘false imprisonment’.135 This has a number of practical, as well as conceptual, 
implications. The purpose of this essay is to explore those implications through 
reference to the Covid-19 (coronavirus) pandemic and the associated lock-
down(s) implemented to mitigate its effects. The facts arising from the 
localised lock-down imposed at Manchester Metropolitan University provide 
a useful case study; here, approximately fifteen-hundred students were sent an 
email by the University asking them to self-isolate for fourteen days to inhibit 
the spread of the Covid-19 virus. Many students later reported that they only 
became aware of the situation after security guards actively prevented them 
from leaving their halls of residence. In the immediate aftermath of this event, 
there have been reports that some students are considering legal action and 
seeking to raise claims of ‘false imprisonment’ against the institution.136 
This essay consequently explores the possibility of factually analogous 
claims succeeding in Scotland (not a mere matter of fancy, given reports of 
comparable situations in this jurisdiction),137 with specific reference to the 
doctrinal differences between the English law of ‘false imprisonment’ and the 
Scots law of delict pertaining to deprivation of liberty effected by private 
 
130 At least insofar as the substantive law is concerned: Sellar,  A Tale of Two Receptions, passim. 
131 MacKenzie divides the classification of ‘injuries’ into those which are ‘real’ and those which are ‘verbal’, 
consistent with D.47.10.1.1 (Ulpian, citing Labeo) and later Civilian jurisprudence: See MacKenzie, 
Matters Criminal, Tit. XXX, I (p.304) 
132 Of which, see Paton, Evaluation of the Institutions, p.201 
133 Walker, Delict, p.681 
134 See Reid, Personality, paras.5.02-5.03 
135 English common law knows of no analogue to the actio iniuriarum: Descheemaeker and Scott, 
Iniuria, p.2 
136 Speare-Cole, Manchester Students Under Lockdown, passim. 
137 Brooks and Adams, Banned from Socialising, passim.  
ISSN 2634-5102  |Page 44 of 111 
 
@ 2020 University of St Andrews Law Journal  CC BY 4.0 
 
persons (as opposed to state officials).138 In so doing, the essay seeks to fit the 
Scots action(s) for the redress of affronts to ‘personal liberty’ within the wider 
schema of the law of delictual liability. This, it is submitted, is necessary not 
only to ensure the coherence of the legal system as a whole, but also to ensure 
that actions to recover compensation for deprivation of liberty are understood 
by the legal profession and wider public alike. In the absence of such 
understanding, injustice may arise from the success of unmeritorious claims, 
from the failure of logically meritorious claims, or indeed from the failure to 
raise potentially successful claims in the first place.  
 
‘Liberty’ as an aspect of Corpus and the Actio Iniuriarum  
 ‘Actio injuriarum afforded a strong and efficient protection against 
injuries to immaterial interests … [it] was adopted from the Romans in order 
to provide protection against interference with man’s (non-material interest) 
in his dignity and honour’.139 Iniuria in the sense of the actio iniuriarum did 
not simply mean ‘wrongdoing’ in the broadest sense of that term,140 rather it 
denoted hubristic conduct141 which infringed another person’s recognised non-
patrimonial (i.e., ‘dignitary’)142 interest(s).143 It was – and is – thus 
conceptually distinct from actions to repair ‘loss’ [damnum] that have as their 
ancestor the lex Aquila.144 There, iniuria could be demonstrated by pointing to 
the defender’s culpa,145 but to succeed in an actio iniuriarum a pursuer would 
need to demonstrate that the defender had behaved contumeliously.146 Should 
 
138 Interactions between state officials (such as police officers) and private individuals have been 
described as ‘paradigm case[s]’ of wrongful invasion of ‘liberty’ as a protected interest and there is a 
considerable body of Scots authority (based on the Act Anent Wrongous Imprisonment 1701) on this 
topic – of which, see Blackie, Protection of Corpus, p.160; Reid, Malice and Police Privilege, passim. 
This essay, however, is focused on less paradigm cases; those which arise where a private individual, with 
no express state authority (in the form of public legislation permitting the conduct), acts to infringe the 
liberty interests of another private individual.   
139 Zimmermann, Law of Obligations, p.1062 
140 Although that was the word’s original meaning: Birks, The Early History of Iniuria, , p.163 
141 Ibbetson, Iniuria: Roman and English, p.40 
142 Whitty and Zimmermann, Issues and Options, p.3 
143 ‘At a high level of generality, it would probably not be controversial to say that all iniuriae were 
offences against dignity in the broad sense of status or honour (dignitas)’: Descheemaeker and Scott, 
Iniuria, p.13. Although Descheemaeker and Scott here identify dignitas with ‘status or honour’, there is 
a case to be made that existimatio would be the more fitting (in legal, not merely semantic) term to 
describe the highest-level dignitary interest protected by the actio iniuriarum, with dignitas operating 
functionally as a lower-level catch-all sub-category for personality interests which have not been singled 
out for specific protection.  
144 Descheemaeker and Scott, Iniuria, p.2 
145 Ibbetson, Buckland on the Lex Aquilia, p.53; G.3.202; D.9.2.44pr. (Ulpian) 
146 Though certain texts, e.g., D.47.10.33 (Paul) appear to suggest that Roman law required conduct to be 
effected adversus bonus mores and for there have to been contumelia on the part of the defender, it is 
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this be proven alongside affront to a recognised ‘personality interest’, however, 
the defender would be obliged to make reparation, even if the pursuer did not 
suffer any pecuniary ‘loss’.147  
Within Roman law, all iniuriae, in the sense of the nominate delict, were 
said to pertain to a person’s corpus [body], fama [reputation] or dignitas 
[dignity].148 This triad was co-opted and popularised throughout the ius 
commune by Johannes Voet,149 to the extent that Blackie termed corpus, fama 
and dignitas ‘higher level categories… that are central in the general analysis 
of the more systematic jurists’.150 Although affronts to each of these three 
interests are each actionable as iniuria, ‘the protection in the Scots law of delict 
of a person’s interest in his or her bodily integrity and physical freedom [taken 
together under the higher-level heading of corpus]151 from the early modern 
period on has been in different ways separated from the protection of other 
specific interests relating to the person’.152 This has had the net effect of 
obscuring the place of iniuria within the framework of Scots law.153 Unlike in 
South Africa, where iniuria clearly stands alongside the lex Aquilia and the 
‘action for pain and suffering’ as one of the ‘three pillars’ of that jurisdiction’s 
law of delict,154 in Scotland the traditional view has long been that the law of 
delictual liability ‘is founded upon a [unitary] concept of [broad] culpa’.155 This 
concept of culpa is typically said to be derived from the lex Aquilia, although 
in contradistinction to the position in Roman law ‘the word culpa in this [i.e., 
 
‘more likely… that for Ulpian the impropriety of the [defender’s] conduct was bundled up in his notion 
of contumelia, whereas for Paul the two requirements were treated as independent of one another, 
contumelia focusing on the subjective aspect of the [defender’s] conduct and adversus bonus mores 
focusing on its social interpretation’: Ibbetson, Iniuria: Roman and English, p.43 
147 See, e.g., D.47.10.9.1 (Ulpian); the irrelevance of pecuniary ‘loss’ remains a feature of the modern Scots 
actio iniuriarum: Walker, Delict, p.40 
148 Dig.47.10.1.2 (Ulpian) 
149 Johannes Voet (1647-1713) was a Dutch jurist and the son of Paul Voet (1619-1677), who was also a 
jurist. Johannes Voet was the author of, inter alia, an authoritative Commentary on the Pandects: see 
Voet, Commentarius, 47.10.1 
150 Blackie, Doctrinal History, p.2 
151 See Blackie, Protection of Corpus, p.156 
152 Ibid., p.155 
153 This state of affairs was not unique to Scotland: ‘corpus was, in many ways, a victim of its own strength 
as a legally protected interest’ throughout the jurisdictions of the ius commune. ‘Its violation is so 
intuitively wrongful that it hardly needs to be channelled through the – a highly artificial – construct of 
iniuria for a remedy to be granted’ – see Descheemaeker and Scott, Iniuria and the Common Law, p.15 
154 Brown, Revenge Porn and the Actio Iniuriarum, p.403 
155 MacCormick, Culpa, p.13 
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the Scots] context had a wide sense and expresses a liability for dolus and culpa 
in a narrow sense’.156 
This view of the Scots law of delict as predicated entirely on culpa has 
fallen out of fashion. It emerged in the Nineteenth century and has since been 
invoked ‘in cases where there has been a doubt as to the basis of liability’.157 
Nonetheless, it has been said by two of leading lights of Scots law158 that ‘it [is] 
no longer possible to argue that the law was based on one general underlying 
principle such as reparation for culpa or fault… different interests [are] 
protected in different ways often far removed from personal injuries cases 
which have hitherto been considered paradigmatic’.159 This sage statement has 
the benefit of appearing as a statement of the obvious, if only in hindsight.160 
Rather than basing the sum of liability on one singular principle, Scots law has 
historically recognised a basic grammar of Aquilian liability and liability based 
on iniuria,161 with some native nominate delicts (such as assythment) serving 
to redress harm effected to the health, limbs and life of oneself and one’s 
family.162 
In recognition of the fact that it cannot now be said that Scots law is 
predicated on a single principle, it is submitted that there is an impetus for 
Scots lawyers to return to the recognition of the place of the actio iniuriarum 
within the law of delict. The actio iniuriarum is acknowledged as an important 
‘legal ancestor’ in many modern European jurisdictions,163 although the 
process of codification has, in most European jurisdictions, severed the direct 
influence of Roman law as a ‘living’ source.164 Scotland, like South Africa, is 
however (in a sense) a ‘living system of Roman law’, untouched by 
codification.165 Hence, iniuria subsists in this jurisdiction not only as a ‘legal 
ancestor’, but as the prime source of liability in contemporary delictual actions 
 
156 Ibid. 
157 Ibid., p.28 
158 The late Lord Rodger of Earlsferry and the late Professor Joe Thomson. 
159 Thomson, Delict, preface. 
160 It is a gift few possess, to state the obvious in such a way that the obvious only seems obvious after it 
has been stated.  
161 Blackie, Protection of Corpus, p.156 
162 See Black, Delictual Liability in Scotland for Personal Injuries and Death, p.53 
163 Reid, Personality, para.17.18 
164 Zimmermann and Visser, South Africa as a Mixed Legal System, p.3 
165 Descheemaeker and Scott, Iniuria and the Common Law, p.2 
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for assault166 (including sexual assault and rape),167 and (presently) 
defamation.168 Indeed, in any action which seeks recovery of solatium in the 
absence of proof of damnum, the claim is logically predicated on an actio 
iniuriarum.169 
While the ongoing relevance of the actio iniuriarum to modern Scots 
law has been questioned,170 it is here submitted that development of the 
concept is preferable to the available alternatives. In the absence of native 
authority on any given subject, modern Scots practitioners tend to look to 
English (or other Common law) precedents,171 which are typically deemed 
‘persuasive’ authority by the judiciary. There are, however, manifest 
differences between the Scots law of delict and the English law of torts. Most 
significantly, ‘there is no such thing as an exhaustive list of named delicts in 
the law of Scotland. If the conduct complained of appears to be wrongful, the 
law of Scotland will afford a remedy even if there has not been any previous 
instance of a remedy being given in similar circumstances’.172 In contrast, 
within the Common law system, wherein ‘the creation of a new tort is a bold, 
some would say irresponsible, exercise… to embrace something new within the 
concept of delict is so much easier’.173 
There is thus ‘little historical basis in Scots law for the kind of structural 
difficulties that have restricted English law’.174 Scots lawyers should therefore 
be wary of importing Common law authorities into their jurisprudence, lest the 
character of the Scots law of delict be wholly and irretrievably changed. This 
sense of wariness should be further heighted in respect of areas of law where 
there is conceptual incoherence within the Common law tradition itself. As 
noted in the introduction to this essay, the nature of the tort of ‘false 
imprisonment’ is such that certain learned judges and commentators are of the 
 
166 Pillans, Delict, para.6.13 
167 MacLean, Autonomy, the Body and Consent in Delict, para.11.79 
168 Brown, Defamation, p.131 
169 Particularly given that the action and remedy of assythment was abolished in 1976 by the Damages 
(Scotland) Act: see s.8 of that Act (since repealed by s.16 of the Damages (Scotland) Act 2011, although 
no case has been made that this repeal has revived the action). 
170 Reid, Personality, para.17.12 
171 See Brown, The Scottish Legal System, passim.  
172 Micosta SA v Shetland Islands Council 1986 SLT 193, at 198 per Lord Ross 
173 Lord Hope of Craighead, The Strange Habits of the English, (Stair Society, 2009), p.317 
174 Reid, Personality, para.17.17; Reid here refers to the position in respect of informational privacy, but 
her point can be generalised.  
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view that it should not be categorised as a ‘trespass to the person’. Rather, it 
appears that it would be better conceptualised as an ‘action on the case’. In a 
jurisdiction such as Scotland, where these terms are meaningless, there is a 
risk that if case law concerning ‘false imprisonment’ is deemed ‘persuasive’ and 
thus received as law, then the structure of the law itself will break down. 
Instead of a principled and rational system, there would be only a pigeonhole 
arrangement of nominate actions. To abandon reason and make it the slave of 
alien precedent would be a retrograde step.  
There is, however, a dearth of native Scots authority on the subject of 
deprivation of liberty effected by private persons. While it is not the case that 
‘wrongful detention by private persons now occurs only rarely’,175 as figures 
from the National Crime Agency in respect of human trafficking bear out,176 it 
is nevertheless the case that private law actions concerning wrongful detention 
are rare.177 It is consequently natural for Scots lawyers to seek guidance from 
the law of other jurisdictions when faced with problems arising from such 
matters. To argue that Scots lawyers should resist the importation of alien 
precedents into their system is not, however, to argue that they should resist 
the use of foreign precedents. Merely, it is to claim that for a foreign precedent 
to be deemed ‘persuasive’ by the Scottish courts it ought to be decided on the 
basis of principles which are consistent with the norms of Scots law. The 
English tort of false imprisonment, with its different history and 
jurisprudential background, is not analogous to the Scots action for the 
wrongful deprivation of liberty and consequently reliance on authorities 
concerning such could potentially introduce conceptual confusion, rather than 
clarity, to Scots law.  
Though geographically distant from one another, South Africa has been 
described as Scotland’s closest legal neighbour. This is due to the fact that 
Scotland and South Africa share a common uncodified Roman-Dutch heritage 
and have each (at various times, to various degrees) been influenced by the 
Anglo-American Common law.178 South Africa has thus been able to build up 
 
175 As suggested by Reid: ibid., para.5.48 
176 See National Crime Agency, National Referral Mechanism Statistics – End of Year Summary 2018 
(published 20/03/2019)   
177 See Brown, Servitude, Slavery and Scots Law, p.371 
178 Brown, The Scottish Legal System, p.59 
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a ‘copious and vigorous case law’ concerning the actio iniuriarum179 and, given 
the conceptual and historical similarities between Scots and South African 
jurisprudence, this body of authorities could serve as a fruitful source of 
borrowing for Scottish lawyers.180 There is little question, as there were in 
bygone days,181 of the practical accessibility of such authorities: a great many 
are freely available via the South African Legal Information Institute (SAFLII) 
database. 
In Scotland, ‘since the earliest accounts of the law of reparation, 
infringement of liberty has been regarded as a "delinquence" which requires to 
be compensated’.182 Comparably, in South Africa, ‘it has long been settled law 
that the arrest and detention of a person are a drastic infringement of his basic 
rights, in particular the rights to freedom and human dignity, and that, in the 
absence of due and proper legal authorisation, such arrest and detention are 
unlawful.’183 The South African actions for recovery of solatium in the face of 
wrongful arrest, detention (by private persons) and imprisonment (by state 
officials) is grounded in the actio iniuriarum.184 Though the institutional 
connection to the actio iniuriarum is less clearly articulated in Scotland than 
in South Africa, in both jurisdictions the deprivation of a person’s liberty is not 
actionable as a tort per se, but rather actionable on the basis of the delictual 
liability arising from interference with the detained person’s dignitary interest 
in their corpus. ‘Borrowing’ principles and authorities from South African 
jurisprudence is, thus, less likely to do structural damage to the Scots law of 
delict than is borrowing from Common law authorities.  
 
Deprivation of Liberty as Iniuria  
As an action based on iniuria, in any claim for redress following 
deprivation of liberty, the pursuer must be able to prove that they have 
subjectively suffered ‘affront’185 (and so deprivation of liberty is not, logically, 
 
179 Reid, Personality, para.17.12 
180 See Burchell, Personality Rights in South Africa, pp.352-353 
181 See Blackie and Whitty, Scots Law and the New Ius Commune, p.80 
182 Reid, Malice and Police Privilege, p.175 
183 Theobald v Minister of Safety and Security and Others 2011 (1) SACR 379 (GSJ), at 389F 
184 Nkosi, Balancing Deprivation of Liberty and Quantum of Damages, p.66 
185 Le Roux v Dey [2011] 3 SA 274 (CC), para.143 
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actionable where the pursuer did not realise that they were detained)186 in 
addition to establishing the objective wrongfulness of the defender’s 
conduct.187 Whether or not conduct is to be understood as ‘objectively 
wrongful’ turns on the question of whether or not said conduct is deemed 
juridically contra bonos mores [contrary to good morals].188 This standard – 
though presented here in the ‘decent obscurity of a learned language’189 – is 
simply analogous to the familiar benchmark of ‘public policy’,190 which is 
recognised as presently permeating the law of delict.191 Although the courts in 
Scotland have not, in recent times, analysed acts amounting to the deprivation 
of liberty effected by private persons within the schema of liability for iniuria, 
it is here submitted that the extant Scots authorities on the subject (such as 
they exist) can be fit neatly within this framework.  
It is said that to succeed in an actio iniuriarum there must be animus 
iniuriandi [intention to injure] on the part of the delinquent.192 To say such 
has been described by Zimmermann, however, as an ‘ahistorical 
generalisation’.193 While it is the case that a delinquent must possess animus 
in order to be capable of effecting the delict of iniuria, animus here does not 
mean simply ‘intention’ but rather to the broader ability of a person to form an 
‘intention’ as a matter of law.194 In other words, iniuria cannot be inflicted by 
one who is insane or of nonage.195 It can only be inflicted by one who is capable 
of understanding the wrongfulness of their actions, even if as a matter of 
subjective fact the individual in question does not in fact appreciate the 
wrongfulness of said action.196 Consequently, in spite of what the terminology 
of animus iniuriandi implies, the need be no design to actively cause affront. 
Iniuria may be inflicted by one who affronts the personality interests of 
 
186 Cf. D.47.10.3.2; see also Ibbetson, Iniuria: Roman and English, fn.41 
187 Ibid., para.70 
188 Strauss, Bodily Injury, p.182 
189 Johnston, Res Merae Facultatis, p.141  
190 Strauss, Bodily Injury, p.182 
191 See Pillans, Delict, preface 
192 Erskine Institute, 4.4.80 
193 Zimmermann, Obligations, pp.1059-1061 
194 Ibbetson, Iniuria: Roman and English, p.40 
195 D.47.10.3.1 (Ulpian)  
196 D.47.10.3.2 (Ulpian); although Ulpian here suggests that one need not be aware of the wrongdoing for 
it to be actionable, in D.47.10.11.1 it is stressed that an actio iniuriarum will not lie where there is 
dissimulation on the part of the ‘victim’.  
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another through misplaced zeal as much as where one has acted with an 
express design to injure.197 
It is for this reason that in Stevens v Yorkhill NHS Trust,198 the 
pursuer’s case was permitted to proceed to probation notwithstanding the 
absence of any claim of malice, intention or ‘animus iniuriandi’ on the part of 
the defenders. This ostensible oddity can be rationalised on the grounds that 
the core of the actio iniuriarum is the contumelia displayed by the wrongdoer. 
Contumelia – hubristic disregard of a recognised personality interest – cannot 
be effected through simple negligence, but it is quite apparent that one might 
recklessly disregard another’s rights.199 Hence, conduct might be actionable as 
iniuria where it is unthinking (as where one acts without thinking about the 
interests of others),200 but not where the alleged perpetrator is incapable of 
thinking.  
An actio iniuriarum thus occurs where a delinquent, who is compos 
mentis, hubristically acts to the subjective and objective affront of another 
person’s recognised personality interest(s). Liberty, as an interest which falls 
under the ‘higher-level’ category of corpus, is manifestly a recognised and 
protected personality interest. Consequently, affronts to liberty are, in Scots 
law as in South Africa, ‘injurious’ in the technical sense of that term. As such, 
in Scots law the act of hubristically depriving another of their liberty is 
actionable sine damno – that is, without proof of loss. Solatium, rather than 
‘damages’,201 is payable as recognition that a wrong has been committed by the 
delinquent.202 That solatium is payable sine damno ostensibly marks a point 
of similarity with ‘false imprisonment’, but this point of analogy should not be 
stretched too far. An actio iniuriarum does not give rise to liability ‘per se’ in 
the Anglo-American sense. Rather, that solatium is payable sine damno is a 
 
197 The paradigm exemplar of such would be where a physician provides medical treatment without the 
consent of, or against the wishes of, their patient. Here, the benevolent intention of the doctor is 
irrelevant; in disregarding the patient’s personality interests, even in the perceived best interests of the 
patient, the physician commits iniuria in the form of assault: see Brown, When the Exception is the Rule, 
p.37 
198 [2006] CSOH 143 
199 See the discussion in Smith, Damn, Injuria, Damn, p.126 
200 David Ibbetson, Iniuria, Roman and English, p.40 
201 ‘Though typically conflated or taken together, [damages and solatium] are conceptually separate: 
damages repair instances of damnum (loss), while an award of solatium affords reparation for non-
patrimonial injury or affront: see Brown, Defamation, p.131 
202 ‘It should be noted that ‘in principle solatium for "hurt feelings" caused by affront based upon the 
actio injuriarium is a different animal to the solatium that can be awarded to a claimant for physical or 
psychiatric injury’: Stevens, para.63 
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relic of the history of the actio iniuriarum as a penal delict.203 In recognition 
of the aversion of modern Scots law to private penal remedies, however, 
solatium was ‘effortlessly reinterpreted as being purely compensatory when 
the time came for legal writers to fit the actio iniuriarum into the modern 
theory of Scots delict law’.204 
‘Unlike officials operating under statutory authority, private persons do 
not enjoy any form of privilege and thus malice need not be proved in order to 
establish liability’ for depriving another of their liberty.205 It is sufficient for 
the pursuer to show that the detention was ‘wrongful’.206 This, it is submitted, 
corresponds with the framework of liability based on iniuria; the threshold for 
what amounts to contumelious conduct is lower where one acts without grant 
of legal authority. A police officer or other such state official who infringes the 
liberty interest of a private person does not axiomatically commit a legal 
wrong, for they enjoy a privilege which ordinary persons do not.207 Hence, the 
courts require more than proof of the mere act of detention where the alleged 
wrongdoer is a state official.208 Where the defender is a private person, 
however, the ‘wrongfulness’ of the act will be presumed in the absence of 
vitiating factors.209 In other words, where the alleged delinquent is a state 
official, the onus is on the pursuer to prove that the defender’s conduct was 
positively contra bonos mores. Where the alleged delinquent is a private 
person, it is for the defender to demonstrate that their conduct was not contra 
bonos mores.  
The formal need to demonstrate the objective ‘wrongfulness’ of the act 
complained of marks the modern Scots action for wrongful detention as a child 
of iniuria rather than of strict liability. While in practice the ease with which 
 
203 ‘In Scots law, the solatium awarded by courts to the successful claimant under iniuria… was originally 
regarded as being entirely penal’: Descheemaeker, Solatium and Injury to Feelings, p.73 
204 Ibid. 
205 Reid, Personality, para.5.50 
206 Smith v Green (1853) 15 D. 549; MacKenzie v Young (1902) 10 SLT 231  
207 This is not to say that a private person who detains another necessarily commit a wrong: one may 
legitimately act to protect one’s proprietary interest (Bell, Principles, §2032) or where there is ‘moral 
certainty’ that a crime has been committed: SME, Criminal Procedure, (2002 Reissue), para.101. Such 
considerations are, it is submitted however, a mere vitiation of the general rule that deprivation of liberty 
is contra bonos mores; the wrongfulness of deprivation of liberty, in other words, has to be weighed 
against other public policy considerations, such as those stemming from the law of property or from the 
general proposition that people in society should not commit crimes.  
208 See Whitehouse v Gormley [2018] CSOH 93, para.164. See also Lindsay Relegated No Longer?, 
passim.  
209 See, e.g., Reid, Personality, para.5.54 
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‘wrongfulness’ might be established in cases against private persons, in the face 
of the presumption thereof, is such that one might describe liability for such as 
‘strict’ de facto if not de jure,210 the temptation to categorise wrongful 
detention in this manner should be resisted. To do so would, as occurred in 
respect of the delict of defamation, have a deleterious effect on the coherence 
and rationality of Scots law.211 When faced with novel problems arising out of 
conduct amounting to deprivation of liberty, Scots lawyers should 
consequently avoid looking to Anglo-American precedent. Instead, 
comparative consideration of South African authorities would allow for the 
development of a more coherent and principled framework which is in keeping 
with the spirit of Scots law.  
 
Conclusion 
The above discussion, as indicated in the introduction, is not mooted as a 
matter of idleness. It is of considerable practical importance given the reports 
of the alleged ‘detention’ of students in their halls of residence in universities 
throughout the United Kingdom. While there exists the possibility that actions 
based on ‘false imprisonment’ might succeed throughout in the UK’s Common 
law jurisdictions, the legal position is conceptually different in Scotland. 
Indeed, as discussed in this essay, that position is so different due to 
fundamental dissimilarities between Common law jurisprudence and the 
Mixed jurisprudence of Scotland that Scots lawyers must be wary of taking any 
‘lessons’ from court judgments concerning the tort of false imprisonment. 
Liability for deprivation of liberty in Scotland is not ‘strict’ and so facts which 
give rise to a right of reparation in the Common law may not necessarily do so 
in Scots law. 
 
Universities, though (autonomous) public bodies, are private ‘persons’ in 
terms of the law of delict; hence they can sue (and be sued) in their own name. 
Within the context of the subject-matter of this essay, they have no special 
status in private law and nor do their security staff. Hence, university 
employees do not enjoy any privilege to detain private persons; prima facie 
 
210 This position would thus mirror the development of the Scots common law pertaining to defamation: 
See Blackie, Defamation, p.634 
211 See the discussion in Brown, Defamation, passim.  
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detention effected by university security staff is consequently unlawful. This 
presumption of wrongdoing is rebuttable, however. Provided that the detainer 
can show that their conduct was not contumelious – in other words, that what 
they did was not contra bonos mores, i.e., contrary to public policy – then they 
might escape liability for their actions. In practice, this would be a very difficult 
thing for the detainer to prove, since, any argument to the effect that the ends 
justify the means will not defeat a claim of iniuria. One who hubristically 
infringes the personality interest(s) of another commits a wrong, regardless of 
their subjective benevolent intent. At best, it may be argued that the de facto 
confinement of students who are expected to self-isolate due to their exhibiting 
Covid-19 symptoms is not contra bonos mores, since it is in keeping with 
public policy to prevent the spread of infectious disease.  
 
 The key practical difference between the law of Scotland and that of the rest 
of the UK lies thus in the fact that for an instance of wrongful detention to be 
actionable in Scotland the pursuer must logically have suffered a demonstrable 
subjective affront. Consequently, evidence that the pursuer was not aware of 
or bothered by the detention, or that they passively and pleasantly acquiesced 
in it, will not give rise to a right of reparation. This is in contrast with the 
position under the nominate tort of false imprisonment, where a right of 
reparation does arise even if the purported ‘victim’ was unaware of their 
predicament.212 The implications of this distinction in cases of mass detention 
are manifest. While in the Common law, proof that one student has been in 
fact ‘falsely imprisoned’ in their halls of residence would logically mean that 
every other student confined to those same halls would have a right of action, 
in Scotland the onus is on each individual pursuer to demonstrate that they 
knew of and were affronted by the fact of detention.  
Like the Roman jurists, the English judiciary have in the past 
demonstrated a studied ‘ability not to extend conclusions to the point of 
absurdity.’213 Faced with a preponderance of claims for damages from those 
who have suffered no meaningful harm, in circumstances in which the 
deprivation of liberty may be deemed in the ‘public interest’, the English courts 
 
212 Murray v Ministry of Defence [1988] 1 WLR 692; Meering v. Grahame-White Aviation Co. Ltd. 
(1920) 122 LT 44, pp.54-55, per Atkin LJ.  
213 Watson, Roman Slave Law, p.25 
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may rule against recoverability on grounds of public policy, notwithstanding 
the internal logic of the rules pertaining to strict liability. The position in 
Scotland has the potential to be more principled: While the courts may act so 
as to achieve the same practical outcome, by predicating the law pertaining to 
deprivation of liberty upon iniuria as opposed to some strict liability nominate 
action, particular claims may be allowed or denied depending on their own 
merits, without abandoning the internal logic of the law. Here, one is reminded 
of the title of the festschrift for Professor George Gretton: There is Nothing so 
Practical as a Good Theory.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
